Made by AI, reviewed by Ivan Jureta on .
Illustrative scenario. This log describes a hypothetical decision; organisations are identified by role, not by name.
How a listed company board should respond to conduct allegations against its chief executive during an independent investigation
The board of a large listed manufacturer must decide how to respond when its chief executive faces allegations about undisclosed personal relationships while an independent investigation is under way. The log compares retaining the chief executive, a leave of absence, accepting resignation with an interim chief executive and an independent chair, and naming a permanent successor at once. Readers can see how investigation exposure, operational continuity, stakeholder confidence, succession quality, board independence and reversibility trade off, and how the proposed interim route is governed, implemented and reviewed.
The options
The question: How should the board respond to conduct allegations against its chief executive while an independent investigation is under way: retain the chief executive pending the findings, place them on leave with an acting replacement, accept their resignation with an interim chief executive and an independent chair, or accept the resignation and appoint a permanent successor at once?
Option 1: Retain the chief executive pending the investigation
For
- The chief executive's close identification with the strategy and principal customer relationships means that retaining them avoids disruption, and some investors regard the chief executive as hard to replace.
Against
- Retaining the chief executive ties the company's standing to each further report, and an early expression of support can be overtaken by new allegations before the facts are established.
- Accepting the resignation, with the chief financial officer as interim chief executive and an independent chair, is the proposed course because it separates the company's leadership from the conduct question before the results release, keeps an experienced executive in charge of finance and the results timetable, strengthens independent oversight in line with the OECD Principles, and leaves the permanent appointment to a full search. Retaining the chief executive is not preferred because each further report would reach the company directly and the research evidence points to losses of value and of business partners. A leave of absence is not preferred because it creates two centres of authority and an open question over a return, which slows decisions and deters candidates. Appointing a permanent successor at once is not preferred because a choice of that weight made within days risks poor vetting and a poor fit.
- The same OECD Principles state that, in single-tier board systems, separating the roles of chief executive and chair is regarded as good practice because it balances power, increases accountability and improves the board's capacity to decide independently of management, and that an independent lead director is an alternative only where the role has enough authority to lead the board when management has clear conflicts.
- Peer-reviewed research by Cline, Walkling and Yore (2018) found that firms whose executives are accused of personal indiscretions lose significant market value, see lower operating margins and lose business partners, face a higher likelihood of unrelated shareholder litigation and government investigations, and that such indiscretions are more frequent at poorly governed firms where disciplinary turnover is less likely.
- ISO 37000:2021 guidance on the governance of organizations states that the governing body remains accountable for the organization's actions and omissions, should exercise active oversight through clear roles and reporting, and should set the tone for ethical behaviour, which places the response to the chief executive's conduct squarely with the board rather than management.
Option 2: Place the chief executive on leave with an acting replacement
For
- A leave of absence avoids a final judgment before the facts are established and keeps open the return of a chief executive closely identified with the company's success.
Against
- A leave creates two centres of authority and an open question over the chief executive's return, which slows decisions and keeps every new report attached to the company.
- Accepting the resignation, with the chief financial officer as interim chief executive and an independent chair, is the proposed course because it separates the company's leadership from the conduct question before the results release, keeps an experienced executive in charge of finance and the results timetable, strengthens independent oversight in line with the OECD Principles, and leaves the permanent appointment to a full search. Retaining the chief executive is not preferred because each further report would reach the company directly and the research evidence points to losses of value and of business partners. A leave of absence is not preferred because it creates two centres of authority and an open question over a return, which slows decisions and deters candidates. Appointing a permanent successor at once is not preferred because a choice of that weight made within days risks poor vetting and a poor fit.
- Peer-reviewed research by Ballinger and Marcel (2010) found that interim chief executive successions are common among listed firms, are associated with lower firm performance while the interim serves, and that the effect depends on whether the interim also holds the chair, which argues for keeping any interim period short and the chair role separate.
Option 3: Accept resignation with an interim chief executive and independent chair
For
- Accepting the resignation removes the question of the chief executive's position from the company's daily operations, lets the investigation proceed without an incumbent's interest in its outcome, and places an experienced finance executive who knows the results timetable in charge.
- Accepting the resignation, with the chief financial officer as interim chief executive and an independent chair, is the proposed course because it separates the company's leadership from the conduct question before the results release, keeps an experienced executive in charge of finance and the results timetable, strengthens independent oversight in line with the OECD Principles, and leaves the permanent appointment to a full search. Retaining the chief executive is not preferred because each further report would reach the company directly and the research evidence points to losses of value and of business partners. A leave of absence is not preferred because it creates two centres of authority and an open question over a return, which slows decisions and deters candidates. Appointing a permanent successor at once is not preferred because a choice of that weight made within days risks poor vetting and a poor fit.
- The board of directors takes this decision in a special session, without the chief executive, on the advice of the independent directors overseeing the investigation, external counsel and the general counsel.
- The chief financial officer, the general counsel, the heads of the principal business units and investor relations were consulted on continuity of operations, customer delivery, the results release and market disclosure.
- The G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2023) list among the board's key functions selecting, overseeing and monitoring key executives and, when necessary, replacing them and overseeing succession planning, and state that the board should be responsible for chief executive succession planning with a view to business continuity.
- The same OECD Principles state that, in single-tier board systems, separating the roles of chief executive and chair is regarded as good practice because it balances power, increases accountability and improves the board's capacity to decide independently of management, and that an independent lead director is an alternative only where the role has enough authority to lead the board when management has clear conflicts.
Against
- Combining the interim chief executive and finance roles concentrates workload and control in one person at a moment of heightened scrutiny, and the departure of a chief executive closely identified with the strategy may unsettle customers and staff.
- Peer-reviewed research by Ballinger and Marcel (2010) found that interim chief executive successions are common among listed firms, are associated with lower firm performance while the interim serves, and that the effect depends on whether the interim also holds the chair, which argues for keeping any interim period short and the chair role separate.
Option 4: Accept resignation and appoint a permanent successor at once
For
- Naming a permanent successor at once ends uncertainty about leadership and avoids the performance penalty associated with interim periods.
- Peer-reviewed research by Ballinger and Marcel (2010) found that interim chief executive successions are common among listed firms, are associated with lower firm performance while the interim serves, and that the effect depends on whether the interim also holds the chair, which argues for keeping any interim period short and the chair role separate.
Against
- A permanent appointment made within days of a crisis gives little time for vetting or for considering external candidates, and a poor fit would be costly and slow to reverse.
- Accepting the resignation, with the chief financial officer as interim chief executive and an independent chair, is the proposed course because it separates the company's leadership from the conduct question before the results release, keeps an experienced executive in charge of finance and the results timetable, strengthens independent oversight in line with the OECD Principles, and leaves the permanent appointment to a full search. Retaining the chief executive is not preferred because each further report would reach the company directly and the research evidence points to losses of value and of business partners. A leave of absence is not preferred because it creates two centres of authority and an open question over a return, which slows decisions and deters candidates. Appointing a permanent successor at once is not preferred because a choice of that weight made within days risks poor vetting and a poor fit.
Criteria and values
| Criterion | Option 1 | Option 2 | Option 3 | Option 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strength of independent board oversight | low | moderate | high | moderate |
| Residual legal, regulatory and reputational exposure | high | moderate | low | low |
| Months until permanent leadership is settled | 2 month | 9 month | 6 month | 0 month |
| Continuity of strategy and customer programmes | high | low | moderate | moderate |
| Reversibility once the investigation reports | moderate | high | moderate | low |
| Near-term stakeholder confidence | low | moderate | high | moderate |
| Quality of the permanent succession process | — | moderate | high | low |
Evidence
Sources
- https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/322/322.en.pdf
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.11.008
- https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.808
- https://committee.iso.org/ISO_37000_Governance