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Illustrative scenario. This log describes a hypothetical decision; organisations are identified by role, not by name.
How a research-based pharmaceutical manufacturer should fund the late-stage programme for its lead metabolic candidate
A large research-based pharmaceutical manufacturer decides how to pay for the pivotal clinical programme of its lead candidate in a highly prevalent chronic metabolic indication, at a point when several of its largest products are approaching the end of exclusivity. The log compares full internal funding, co-funding by a financial partner against success-based payments, sale of a participation in future product sales, a co-development and commercialisation agreement with another manufacturer, and a reduced programme funded internally. Options are compared on own development spend, lifetime economics retained, control of development and pricing, exposure if the programme fails, encumbrance on product assets, breadth of the evidence package and time until funding is in place. Readers can see how a financing choice is also a control and evidence-strategy choice, and how contingent, success-linked obligations are weighed against permanent claims on a product.
The options
The question: How should the pivotal clinical programme for the group's lead metabolic candidate be funded: entirely from internal resources, co-funded by a financial partner against success-based payments, financed by selling a participation in the medicine's future sales, shared with another manufacturer under a co-development and commercialisation agreement, or reduced in scope and funded internally?
Option 1: Fund the pivotal programme in full from internal resources
For
- Nothing is paid away from the medicine's future sales, so if the candidate succeeds the group keeps the whole of a franchise it expects to be among its largest, and no counterparty has to be found, negotiated with or lived with for a decade.
Against
- Peer-reviewed analysis of several decades of clinical trial records reports that only about half of metabolic and endocrine candidates that enter pivotal testing go on to approval, so concentrating the whole programme on the group's own accounts puts a write-off of that size in the same years in which several large products lose exclusivity.
- Co-funding with a financial partner is the proposed course because it is the only route that reduces development spend materially in the years of maximum earnings pressure while leaving trial design, the regulatory file and pricing entirely with the group, and because its cost is contingent: nothing is paid if the programme fails, and what is paid on success comes out of revenue the medicine has already produced. Funding the programme in full internally is not preferred because it concentrates the cost of a programme with roughly even odds in precisely the years in which exclusivity losses bite. Selling a participation in future sales is not preferred because the market standard for such transactions now includes security over product intellectual property, and an open-ended share of sales is a heavier long-run price than capped success payments for a product expected to anchor the franchise. A co-development agreement with another manufacturer is not preferred because it gives away both a large share of the economics and the sole control of development and pricing that the franchise strategy depends on, and because negotiation and competition clearance would delay enrolment. Reducing the programme is not preferred because the comparative evidence it would drop is the evidence on which the differentiation, and therefore the price, rests.
Option 2: Co-fund with a financial partner for success-based payments
For
- Cash leaves the group only after the medicine is generating revenue, so development spend falls in the years of greatest earnings pressure and the payments arrive in years when the product itself is funding them.
- Peer-reviewed analysis of several decades of clinical trial records reports that only about half of metabolic and endocrine candidates that enter pivotal testing go on to approval, so concentrating the whole programme on the group's own accounts puts a write-off of that size in the same years in which several large products lose exclusivity.
- Co-funding with a financial partner is the proposed course because it is the only route that reduces development spend materially in the years of maximum earnings pressure while leaving trial design, the regulatory file and pricing entirely with the group, and because its cost is contingent: nothing is paid if the programme fails, and what is paid on success comes out of revenue the medicine has already produced. Funding the programme in full internally is not preferred because it concentrates the cost of a programme with roughly even odds in precisely the years in which exclusivity losses bite. Selling a participation in future sales is not preferred because the market standard for such transactions now includes security over product intellectual property, and an open-ended share of sales is a heavier long-run price than capped success payments for a product expected to anchor the franchise. A co-development agreement with another manufacturer is not preferred because it gives away both a large share of the economics and the sole control of development and pricing that the franchise strategy depends on, and because negotiation and competition clearance would delay enrolment. Reducing the programme is not preferred because the comparative evidence it would drop is the evidence on which the differentiation, and therefore the price, rests.
- The executive committee takes this decision on the joint recommendation of the chief financial officer and the head of research and development, with the board's audit and finance committee informed because the obligation extends several years beyond the current planning horizon.
- The treasury, tax, commercial and regulatory functions, the programme's clinical leadership and external counsel were consulted on the structure, in particular on how the contingent obligation is accounted for and on the wording that keeps the partner's role financial.
Against
- The success payments are concentrated in the first years after launch, when commercial investment is also at its heaviest, and because they are tied to sales thresholds their total is not fixed at the outset, so a strongly performing product costs more than the headline contribution suggests.
Option 3: Sell a participation in the medicine's future sales
For
- The financing is non-recourse and the buyer takes no part in development decisions, so cash can be raised against the asset without conceding any governance and without adding debt that must be serviced whatever happens to the programme.
Against
- A share of sales runs for as long as the product sells and is not capped in the way milestone payments are, and the security over product intellectual property that investors have come to expect would constrain later financing, partnering or disposal of the franchise the medicine is meant to anchor.
- Co-funding with a financial partner is the proposed course because it is the only route that reduces development spend materially in the years of maximum earnings pressure while leaving trial design, the regulatory file and pricing entirely with the group, and because its cost is contingent: nothing is paid if the programme fails, and what is paid on success comes out of revenue the medicine has already produced. Funding the programme in full internally is not preferred because it concentrates the cost of a programme with roughly even odds in precisely the years in which exclusivity losses bite. Selling a participation in future sales is not preferred because the market standard for such transactions now includes security over product intellectual property, and an open-ended share of sales is a heavier long-run price than capped success payments for a product expected to anchor the franchise. A co-development agreement with another manufacturer is not preferred because it gives away both a large share of the economics and the sole control of development and pricing that the franchise strategy depends on, and because negotiation and competition clearance would delay enrolment. Reducing the programme is not preferred because the comparative evidence it would drop is the evidence on which the differentiation, and therefore the price, rests.
Option 4: Share costs and economics with another manufacturer under a co-development agreement
For
- A partner brings commercial infrastructure in the indication as well as cash, which would shorten the time to reach prescribers at launch and spread the cost of a launch that will have to be large to compete with established products.
Against
- A permanent share of the franchise passes to a competitor in the same indication, joint governance slows decisions that the pivotal programme cannot afford to have slowed, and the negotiation and clearance that such an agreement requires would sit directly in front of the enrolment timetable.
- Co-funding with a financial partner is the proposed course because it is the only route that reduces development spend materially in the years of maximum earnings pressure while leaving trial design, the regulatory file and pricing entirely with the group, and because its cost is contingent: nothing is paid if the programme fails, and what is paid on success comes out of revenue the medicine has already produced. Funding the programme in full internally is not preferred because it concentrates the cost of a programme with roughly even odds in precisely the years in which exclusivity losses bite. Selling a participation in future sales is not preferred because the market standard for such transactions now includes security over product intellectual property, and an open-ended share of sales is a heavier long-run price than capped success payments for a product expected to anchor the franchise. A co-development agreement with another manufacturer is not preferred because it gives away both a large share of the economics and the sole control of development and pricing that the franchise strategy depends on, and because negotiation and competition clearance would delay enrolment. Reducing the programme is not preferred because the comparative evidence it would drop is the evidence on which the differentiation, and therefore the price, rests.
Option 5: Reduce the scope of the pivotal programme and fund it internally
For
- Less of the group's own money is exposed to a programme whose outcome is uncertain, and the trials that were dropped could be added later once the first results are known, when their cost would be easier to justify.
Against
- Payers and prescribers compare a new entrant against products they already fund, so without comparative evidence the medicine would be approved into a market that has no reason to pay a premium for it, which removes the commercial rationale for acquiring the candidate in the first place.
- Co-funding with a financial partner is the proposed course because it is the only route that reduces development spend materially in the years of maximum earnings pressure while leaving trial design, the regulatory file and pricing entirely with the group, and because its cost is contingent: nothing is paid if the programme fails, and what is paid on success comes out of revenue the medicine has already produced. Funding the programme in full internally is not preferred because it concentrates the cost of a programme with roughly even odds in precisely the years in which exclusivity losses bite. Selling a participation in future sales is not preferred because the market standard for such transactions now includes security over product intellectual property, and an open-ended share of sales is a heavier long-run price than capped success payments for a product expected to anchor the franchise. A co-development agreement with another manufacturer is not preferred because it gives away both a large share of the economics and the sole control of development and pricing that the franchise strategy depends on, and because negotiation and competition clearance would delay enrolment. Reducing the programme is not preferred because the comparative evidence it would drop is the evidence on which the differentiation, and therefore the price, rests.
Criteria and values
| Criterion | Option 1 | Option 2 | Option 3 | Option 4 | Option 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Encumbrance on product assets and future sales | low | moderate | high | moderate | low |
| Control of development and commercial decisions | high | high | high | low | high |
| Lifetime product economics retained | 100% | 92% | — | 60% | 100% |
| Exposure if the programme fails | high | low | low | moderate | moderate |
| Own development spend to submission | 2,600,000,000 USD | 1,100,000,000 USD | 1,600,000,000 USD | 1,300,000,000 USD | 1,800,000,000 USD |
| Breadth of the evidence package | high | high | high | high | low |
| Time until the programme is fully funded | 0 month | 3 month | 4 month | 9 month | 1 month |
Evidence
Sources
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.01.012
- https://academic.oup.com/biostatistics/article/20/2/273/4817524
- https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/obesity-and-overweight
- https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2026/06/fourth-annual-synthetic-royalty-and-drug-development-financing-study.pdf
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